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The politics of local government in Nigeria reloaded has been 
inspired by the 2013 Constitution amendment process initiated by the 
National Assembly. The main objective of the study is to intellectualize local 
government autonomy from a new perspective from the ones in extant 
literature. Using desk research and interview methods, the findings show that 
in both old and new federations the nature and character of the political 
system largely determine the kind of autonomy the central or regional or 
state government devolves to the local unit or local government. The study 
further shows that in Nigeria, the kind of autonomy the federal and state 
governments transfer to the local government is largely shaped by ethnicity 
and prebenal considerations. Also, that the suffocation and subversion of 
local government autonomy is more pronounced at the financial and 
leadership recruitment levels than in any other areas of intergovernmental 
relations.  This explains why members of the political elite engage each other 
in a-tug-of-war over whose apron-string the local government should be tied 
to, rather than allow local governments operate autonomously. The study 
concludes that local government is a unique political structure and the degree 
of autonomy it enjoys from federal or regional or state government is 
congruent with the politics of the state.  Consequently, there is no grand 
theory of local government autonomy that states can adopt and make 
amenable to their politics.  Rather, the nature and character of state politics 
and the historical circumstances of its evolution throw up its own unique 
kind of local government autonomy.  
 
Key words: Autonomy, state politics, constitution and local government 
 
Introduction 
The National Assembly’s oversight function of amending the 1999 
Constitution has once again brought the vexing issue of local government 
autonomy to the front seat of Nigeria’s political arena. Since independence in 
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1960, Nigeria has experimented with different models of local government 
administration (Oyeleye, 1988; Oyediran and Gboyega, 1979). Following the 
first and second military interventions of 1966 and 1967 respectively, and the 
subsequent restructuring of the country from four regions to twelve states, 
the country has witnessed several other restructurings, which have 
culminated into 36 states and 774 local governments. The states and local 
governments differ markedly in size, resources and ethnic compositions. 
However, these marked differences did not stop the military from 
introducing a unified local government system in 1976, and officially 
declaring local government as the third tier of government with specific 
functions. The decree that declared local government as the third tier of 
government was included in the 1979 constitution (and much later the 1999 
constitution) that anchored the transition from military to civilian rule in 
1999, and can be found in the fourth schedule of the 1999 constitution.  
From empirical evidence in extant literature, the rationale behind the 
declaration, principally, was to bring government closer to the people and 
effective service delivery to the rural areas.  It is in connection with the 
aforementioned rationale amongst others that several local government 
reforms have been initiated by successive governments to ensure that they 
are achieved (Olowu, 1984). The Babangida local government reforms 
initiated from 1986-1992, is the most remarkable of all the reforms.  The 
reforms comprise the Dasuki Report initiated by the Buhari administration of 
1983-1985 and the Political Bureau Report, which the Babangida 
administration initiated in 1986 “to search for a viable political future” for 
Nigeria. The reforms were remarkable for a number of reasons. First, it did 
not only introduce, but also amplified the issue of local government financial 
autonomy by ensuring that local governments got their share of the “national 
cake” directly from the federation account. Second, it abrogated the Ministry 
of Local Government and third, introduced the legislative and executive 
arms of government to the local government system in Nigeria.  The reform 
also tacitly freed the local governments financially from the apron string of 
the state governments.  Arguably, the Babangida reforms that freed the local 
government financially from the interferences of state governments was only 
possible because the military administrators that oversee the administration 
at the state level could not defy the commander-in-chief and Head of state 
that appointed them in the first place; a strong attribute of the military 
command structure. 
Unfortunately, rather than build on the gains of the administration,  
successive administrations after the Babangida regime further emasculated 
both the administrative and  financial autonomies of the local government. 
This is one consequence of political instability. Consequently, just like the 
local governments were seriously abused financially and administratively 
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during the military era before and after the Babangida administration, local 
governments have suffered similar fate, from 1999 when the country 
returned to civil governance to date.  
In essence, the local government system in Nigeria is problematic. 
The problem expresses itself in the law establishing local government, its 
structure and the kind of autonomy both the federal and state governments’ 
devolve to the local government as the third tier of government. This article 
addresses a number of issues; first, what is local government autonomy? 
Second, what influences the kind of autonomy that both the federal and state 
governments entrust to the local government? And lastly, what are the 
impediments to local government autonomy? These questions are the 
concerns of this article. 
 
Theoretical Postulation  
In discussing the problem of interference of the higher tiers of 
government in the local government affairs, we wish to indicate the main 
areas of such interferences to ease our discussion and facilitate the 
comprehension of our position. By simple observation, if we look at the way 
politics is played in Nigeria, we see that there is so much of prebendelism a 
la’ Joseph (1989). There is a complex network of cleintelism and patronage. 
This seeps through the political structures starting with the political party in 
power, at the local, state and federal levels. Those who command much cash 
and also fund the ruling party are those who determine who gets what, when 
and how. They are the ones who hand pick the delegates to the party 
convention. They are those who determine the pattern of voting and the 
results of the election at the primary level. They are the ones who influence 
who the party candidates are, and ultimately who wins election into the 
available institutions at various levels. They have a network of clients too. 
This is the root of the matter across party lines.  
A survey of party opinions and conventions reveal easily the 
syndrome of “consensus candidate”. How this consensus is reached is 
usually murky. This is an indication of the ‘invisible’ hand of the patron that 
sponsors the winning candidates. At the state level, contenders of local 
government chairmanship, Vice Chairmanship and Councillors compete with 
one another in winning the approval of the state Governor first before that of 
the delegates. With that, the state Governor maintains a strangle hold of the 
party at that level either alone or in league with the state party chairman. At 
the end of the local government elections these two especially the state 
Governor dictates the tempo, style and rhythm of local government and who 
is appointed and how the money allocated is spent usually with the Governor 
having the lion-share. This is done clandestinely. Aggrieved politicians at 
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this level, say that the State House of Assembly leadership also has their 
informal allocations from the local government funds. 
Apart from the above, the allocation that comes from the federation 
account to the local governments is also controlled by the state Governor, 
even though the money does not pass through the office of the Governor. As 
a puppet, the Council Chairmen are expected to willingly sign off a 
percentage of their allocation to the state Governor. Any chairman who 
refuses to abide by this contraption has the state House of Assembly to 
contend with. The case of Diamen Okon, the former Chairman of Akpabuyo 
local government area in Cross River state versus Donald Duke, the former 
Governor of the state is a good example. Okon was kicked out of office by 
the state House of Assembly ingeniously for refusing to comply with the 
state Governor’s instruction over local government allocation from the 
federation account. Other examples abound across the country. 
Hence, we see that it is not the federal government that controls the 
local government as such. If it does, it is in the area of making sure that 
federal based policies like public health, primary education and public works 
are implemented at the local government level. Even at that, the local 
governments hardly get the total sum of the amount voted for such federal 
funded projects for a number of reasons: first, what each local government 
gets depend on the support they gave to the ruling party in the elections that 
brought it to power. Second, local governments controlled by the opposing 
party to the one in government get less than the local governments controlled 
by the party in government and third, local governments whose state 
Governor is perceived to be disloyal to the President not minding that they 
belong to the same party also gets less intervention grant from the federal 
government. This is the fate of local governments in Rivers state under 
Governor Ameachi, who is currently at loggerhead with President Goodluck 
Jonathan. 
Local government in this kind of situation suffers double blows. 
Generally, the federal government cheats on the lower tiers of governments 
in the generation and distribution of national wealth which it controls in 
practical terms. On its part, unable to fight the federal government, the state 
government preys on the weaker partner without restraint. This is the plight 
of the local government in Nigeria. The control is on political recruitment at 
the leadership level and at the subversion of local government financial 
rights. 
 This thesis is not original. It is anchored on the work of Richard 
Joseph who constructed a mode of analysis and interpretation about the state 
and politics in Nigeria, in his book, Democracy and Prebendal politics in 
Nigeria: the rise and fall of the Second Republic. Joseph’s position is that 
state offices are regarded as prebends that can be appropriated by office 
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holders, who use them to generate material benefit for themselves and their 
Constituents and kin group. This mode of analysis is the theoretical strand 
upon which this study is built.  
 
Local Government Autonomy 
The debate on local government autonomy focuses on what powers 
and functions the central or regional or state government should grant to the 
local units within the political system (for more discussion on this issue see 
Clark, 1984).  However, within the Nigerian context, the 1976 local 
government reform gave us not only the definition of local government, but 
also the basic rudiments of local government autonomy. The 1976 reform 
defines local government as: 
Government at the local level exercised through Representative 
Council established by law to exercise specific powers within defined areas. 
These powers should give the council substantial control over local affairs as 
well as the staff… institutional and financial powers to initiate and direct the 
provision of services and to determine and implement projects so as to 
implement the activities of the state and federal government in their areas, 
and to ensure, through devolution of these functions to these Councils and 
through the active participation of the people and their traditional 
institutions, that local initiative and response to local needs and conditions 
are maximized (p,111). 
The above definition brings out the key elements of local government 
autonomy. First, the local government unit should have a legal personality 
distinct from the state and federal governments. Second, the local 
government ought to have specified powers and functions distinct from the 
state and federal governments. Third, the local government has to operate 
independently of the state and federal governments. That means that the local 
government is not an appendage or field office of the state or federal 
government.  Fourth, local government ought to have the ability to make its 
own laws, rules and regulations. Fifth, local government should have the 
ability to formulate and execute its own policies and the right to recruit, 
promote, develop and discipline its own staff. 
It is pertinent to note that there is never a time that local government 
in Nigeria has been granted the kind of autonomy expounded in our 
definition above. And like we earlier pointed out, in all political systems, the 
kind of autonomy the central or regional government entrust to the local 
units depend largely on the nature and character of state politics. For 
example, in the United States of America, the degree of autonomy granted  
local authorities is derived from ideals and values such as liberty, equality, 
democracy, individualism, unity and diversity. Such ideals are at the very 
core of their national identity and shape the nature and character of state 
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politics. As Rogoveanu (2013) rightly argues, it also shapes the vision which 
Americans have upon the world. These perennial principles, which are an 
important part of the American psyche, have greatly influenced the way 
public policies and laws are made in the United States of America.  
Furthermore, lettering on the same issue, Rogoveanu (2013) aptly points out: 
The concept of liberty has been at the forefront of American political 
culture, and the sheer dominance of liberty-related discourses is indicative of 
this theory. “Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness” as the core 
principles of declaration of Independence are restated in the preamble to the 
Constitution, as “the Blessing of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity” or 
sublimated in an artistic form in the Statue of Liberty(p.6). 
These principles shape federal-state-local relations in the United 
States. Thus, the kind of powers and functions the federal or state 
government devolves to the local unit is remarkably influenced by the 
concept of liberty. The principle of liberty has long guided the American 
experiment with government during and after the American Revolution. 
It is also important to note that there is no political system that the 
local units operate completely independent of the central or regional or state 
government. In an intergovernmental context, there is variety of ways in 
which federal and state governments might contribute to the fiscal 
sustainability of the local government. For example, in older federations like 
the United States of America and Switzerland, the federal and state 
governments do interfere in the activities of the local councils through grant-
in-aid and other intervention programmes, to ensure that they meet their 
obligations to the citizens as a tier of government (see Gamkhar and Pickerill 
(2012) and Rivlin (2012) for a discussion of federal and state governments’ 
positive contribution to local governments in the United States).  In this 
regard, the interference is a positive one; therefore it does not generate any 
negative controversies. The point being made here is that federal and state 
governments’ interferences in the activities of the local government can be 
positive or negative. It is negative when such interference impedes on the 
capacity of the local government to carry out its statutory functions and vice 
versa. It is the former that generates controversies, litigations and seminar 
research.   Positive interferences’ lead to more effective governance at the 
local level and negative ones intensify crises of federalism at the sub national 
level. The negative genus of interference is predominant in the Nigerian 
federation. Scholars, including Ammani (2012) and Akindele and Olaopa 
(2002), commenting on this issue, have described how state governments 
seize federal allocations meant for local governments in their domain and 
misappropriate them; leaving the local governments debilitated. This is the 
kind of interference we will discuss in detail in the subsequent section of this 
article. 
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Local Government Autonomy: The Nigerian Experience 
Nigeria has experimented with various models of local government 
administration before and after independence. According to Ige (1996) 
Nigeria is the only federation in the whole world where the federal 
government decides how, where and when a local government council must 
run. In all other countries, it is the state or regional government that 
legislates on local government. As a matter of fact, we are not surprised 
because this is evident in the kind of federation the military instituted in 
Nigeria (for a detail discussion on this issue see Nnoli (2011) and Elaigwu, 
(1979)). 
In the colonial era, local government enjoyed a wide range of both 
financial and administrative autonomy. The local government system was 
derived from the British Whitehall model. The colonial government allowed 
each region to oversee the activities of local government under its 
jurisdiction. This means that the legal frame work for local government was 
provided for by each region: The Eastern region local government ordinance 
of 1950, the Western region local government law of 1952 and the 1954 
native authority law in Northern Nigeria. According to Otive (1999), during 
this period, the councils were given a wide range of functions including 
primary education, health, police, and judiciary among others. Furthermore, 
the councils also enjoyed a great measure of autonomy in financial, 
personnel and general administration. As one analyst rightly argues, “it can 
therefore be said that the 1950s, was the era of pupilage for councils in 
modern local government throughout Nigeria”. In other words, the local 
governments were under the regional governments and there was relatively 
little or no interference in the activities of local governments by the federal 
government. In popular Nigerian parlance, the local governments run their 
own show: they were free to decide their own fate among other things, 
generate and spend their revenues, make laws, formulate and execute their 
own policies. The reason for this is not farfetched. The local governments 
were offshoots of the native authority system that were in existence before, 
or created by the British colonialists. They were formidable structures the 
British used to administer the country. They preceded the regional 
governments that were created in 1946. The dominant political culture was 
greatly influenced by the British ethos of governance.  This explains in part 
why in spite of the resentment the educated Nigerians had for the native 
authority system and by extension the local government, it took them time to 
erode the powers and functions the local councils wielded in each of the 
regions. Thus, the nature and character of politics in the 1950s influenced the 
kind of local councils that were in operation at that time.  
The post-colonial era and specifically, between 1960 and 1965, 
witnessed a decline in both the financial and administrative autonomy local 
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governments wielded in the colonial era. This was accompanied by a decline 
in the responsibilities assigned to local governments in the four regions: 
North, East, West and Mid-West. Although, the first Republic was short 
lived, it is not difficult to discern that the intrusiveness of the regional 
governments in local government affairs was as a result of the nature and 
character of the politics of the time. Each region wanted to be in-charge of its 
affairs by usurping some functions of the local councils. During this period, 
the federal government had very little hold on local government councils. 
The local councils were at the clemency of their respective regional 
governments. Most importantly, each region experimented with different 
models of local government administrative system: the Anglo-Saxon and 
French models were widely used. This trend continued and became worse 
under the military with the creation of 12 states, and other subsequent 
restructuring of the Nigerian federation.  
A major reform of the local government system in Nigeria was 
carried out under the military in 1976. Nigeria adopted a unified local 
government administrative system. Local government officially became 
recognized as the third tier of government. The objectives of the reform were 
outlined as follows: 
• To make appropriate services and development activities responsive 
to local wishes and initiatives by devolving or delegating them to 
local representative bodies. 
• To facilitate the exercise of democratic self-government close to the 
grassroots of our society, and to encourage initiative and leadership 
potential. 
• Mobilization of human and material  resources through the 
involvement of members of the public in their local development and 
• To provide a two-way channel of communication between local 
communities and government (both state and federal) (1976 local 
government Reform). 
In certain quarters, the unification policy introduced by the military is 
believed to be the genesis of the vexed issue of local government autonomy 
in Nigeria. According to Otive (1999), the 1976 reform completely eroded 
local government autonomy and laid the basis of interference in the conduct 
of local affairs of local government by military and civilian government 
thereafter. Furthermore, he posits that “the military laid the basis for the 
undemocratic nature of the local government and the erosion of local 
government autonomy”.  But this by itself is a wrong conclusion because the 
1989 Babagida reforms had cancelled all the errors of the previous reforms, 
both civilian and military. At best it is a paradox. 
This abnormality was subtly addressed by the 1999 Constitution in a 
phony manner.  Though the Constitution allows the State House of 
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Assembly to legislate over local governments within their domain; they are 
not allowed to create local governments. Section 7 of the 1999 Constitution 
empowers the state legislature to make laws for the administrative operation 
of local government areas and section 162 authorizes the existence of a state 
and local governments Joint Account. However, these two provisions have 
become the ammunition used by some state governors to incapacitate local 
governments within their states. 
It is important to note that there is never a time in Nigeria’s post-
colonial political history that local governments operated independent of 
both the state and federal governments, which is the crux of local 
government autonomy. The search for this kind of local government system 
has been a mirage.  On this issue, three contending perspectives have 
emerged. The first group interprets local government autonomy to mean 
independence from the interference of state government in the activities of 
local government. The Second, perceives local government autonomy as the 
non- interference of the federal government in the activities of local 
governments, and the third group, maintains that local government autonomy 
means independence from both state and federal governments interference in 
the activities of local councils. This is the dilemma facing local government 
in Nigeria today. At the moment, members of the National Assembly seem to 
be inclined to the first perspective; freeing the local governments from the 
loathsome interferences of state governments, which explains why they want 
to amend section 7 and 162 of the 1999 Constitution. In the draft 
amendment, they recommended the establishment of a Special Federal 
Account upon which the 774 local governments would draw their federal 
allocation; thus circumventing the abhorrent intercession of various state 
governments in local government finances. To be sure, this is what they 
describe as local government financial autonomy. What the National 
Assembly forgets, which they need to be reminded of, is that this method of 
financing local governments in the country has in the past been experimented 
by successive military regimes in the past. It is pertinent to note that 
principally, what the National Assembly did in its review of the 1999 
Constitution was to merely amend the two sections (section 7 and 162 ), that 
places the local government areas under the control of state governments. 
However, the mere alteration of the above sections of the Constitution does 
not free the local governments from the control of the federal government. It 
rather strengthens it. This explains why state governors and the National 
Association of Local Government Employees are opposed to it. They also 
argued that local governments are an integral part of the state and therefore 
cannot be completely independent of the state government. Furthermore, 
they do not want the federal government meddling in the affairs of local 
governments.  Going by the debate in the political sphere, the proposed 
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amendment to section 7 and 162 of the 1999 Constitution is not likely to 
succeed, since it requires 2/3 majority votes of members of the National 
Assembly and 1/3 majority votes of members of the 36 Houses of Assembly 
(state legislatures ) in the country. The possibility of the state governments 
surrendering their financial control of local government to the federal 
government is unlikely, given the nature and character of state politics in 
Nigeria. In Nigerian politics, people think more of what they can benefit 
from the system rather than offering themselves up for service to their 
fatherland. This is what informs the struggle by the state and federal 
governments to control local government allocation from the distributive 
pool account or federation account.  
In essence, there is nothing fundamentally wrong with any of the 
models expounded above. However, there is something deeply wrong with 
the operators of the Nigerian state apparati. Thus, any of these models can 
suffice if the corresponding political culture prevails in the wider political 
system. In all political systems, the political culture defines the principles 
and attitudes that shape the way government is designed and the political 
decisions leaders make. Such political ethics are lacking in Nigeria. The 
characteristics which are predominantly part of the Nigerian psyche are 
ethnicity, nepotism and corruption. These manifestations are at the core of 
her national identity and shape politics and public policies at all spheres of 
governance (federal, state and local). The struggle to control local 
government by state and federal governments is simply a matter of what each 
of them stands to benefit from such control, rather than how such control can 
deliver political dividends to the people at the local level. This argument falls 
within the trajectory of François Bayart’s perception of African politics as 
contained in his book, L’Etat en Arique: La Politique du Ventre1. With this 
kind of political culture in place, nothing positive can be achieved in terms of 
instituting a veritable local government system in Nigeria.  
 
Impediments to Local Government Autonomy 
There exists ample evidence of statutory policies introduced by 
successive governments over the years to curb local government autonomy 
in spite of the fact that the Constitution officially recognizes local 
government as the third tier of government. These measures make it 
impossible for local government to operate independent of both federal and 
state governments. The policies are the institution of Ministry of Local 
Government, Local Government Service Commission, Caretaker Committee 
and appointment of a Sole Administrator to oversee the activities of local 
government .Others include  Office of the Special Adviser to the President 
on local government matters, Office of the Special Adviser to the Governor 
on local government matters, the Senate and House of Representative 
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Committees on local government matters, the State Houses of Assembly 
Committee on local government matters. Closely following the foregoing are 
the hijacking of local government statutory allocations from the federation 
account by some state Governors and none remittance of 10% internally 
generated revenues to local governments by some state governors as 
stipulated by section 162 of the 1999 constitution. A recent survey by 
authors on the financial subversion of local governments by state Governors 
shows that in Cross River state, as a rule, the allocation from the federation 
account is controlled by the state Governor such that in a local government 
where the monthly allocation is 80 million naira, the Chairman of the local 
government is given 4 million naira by the state Governor and is required to 
spend out of pocket, and submit receipt for refund.  These measures 
contribute significantly to the non-performance of local government and the 
erosion of local government autonomy. 
It is important to note that with the exception of the Babangida 
reforms, all other reforms that have been made in the local government 
system over the years consistently decreased local government autonomy 
and increased the interferences of both federal and state governments in the 
activities of local government. The Babangida administration as earlier 
stated, introduced direct federal allocation to local government, abolished the 
Ministry of local government and established executive and legislative arms 
in local government.  The administration also increased local government 
statutory allocation from 15% to 20% with effect from 1992. Rather than 
consolidate the gains made during the Babangida administration, subsequent 
governments have disrupted the floundering local government autonomy and 
democratic processes at the grass root, which were earlier initiated by the 
Babangida administration. As a result, there has been a significant reduction 
in the capacity of the local government in meeting its mandatory objectives. 
Protagonists of the policies earlier mentioned believed it is their duty to 
exercise close oversight over the operation of local governments. The 
symbolism of their argument is in line with our submission on the 
relationship between the nature and character of state politics and local 
government autonomy. It is important to note that most of these measures 
that impede local government autonomy were initiated based on the 
patronage system, which is the dominant nature of state politics in Nigeria. 
Political patronage pervades all levels of governance in Nigeria (federal, 
state and local). However, the local government suffers the most. The ruling 
elites at state and federal levels use local government to distribute all kinds 
of patronage to their supporters. In part, this explains why the ruling elites 
are literally at war to control the local government system in the country. It is 
in connection with this that it is not difficult to understand why the ruling 
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elites at state and federal levels favour measures that will not allow local 
government operate as an independent third tier of government. 
 
Conclusion 
This paper argues that in Nigeria, the kind of autonomy the federal 
and state governments devolve the local government via the Constitution is 
largely determined by the nature and character of the politics of the state. 
This explains why political elites at the federal and state levels are at war 
with each other over who controls the affairs of the local government. In 
Nigeria, politics at all levels of governance (federal, state and local 
governments) is driven by ethnicity, nepotism and corruption. These 
perennial values, which are an important part of the Nigerian psyche, have 
greatly influenced the way public policy and laws are made in Nigeria. These 
values shape federal-state-local relations in the country. Thus, the kind of 
autonomy the federal and state governments allow the local government to 
enjoy is remarkably influenced by these values. Consequently, with this kind 
of political culture in place, nothing positive can be achieved in terms of 
instituting a veritable local government system in Nigeria. We say this 
because there is no political system where the local unit is totally free from 
the regulation of the central or regional or state government. However, they 
do not interfere negatively by usurping the financial resources of the local 
councils and misappropriating them as it is currently being done in Nigeria. 
This is the kind of interference that led to the vex issue of local government 
autonomy. Nevertheless, if the federal and state governments can interfere 
positively in the activities of local governments in Nigeria, there is nothing 
wrong with that, since the local governments cannot operate in isolation. 
They can do that by taking responsibility for functions that can be best 
performed by them and devolve other functions to the local government with 
adequate financial backing. 
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